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Abstract: Three studies examined amnesic H.M.’s use of words, phrases, and propositions 
on the Test of Language Competence (TLC). In Study 1, H.M. used 19 lexical categories 
(e.g., common nouns, verbs) and one syntactic category (noun phrases) with the same 
relative frequency as memory-normal controls, he used no lexical or syntactic category 
with less-than-normal frequency, and he used proper names (e.g., Melanie) and 
coordinative conjunctions (e.g., and) with reliably greater-than-normal frequency. In 
Study 2, H.M. overused proper names relative to controls when answering episodic 
memory questions about childhood experiences in speech and writing, replicating and 
extending Study 1 results for proper names. Based on detailed analyses of the use (and 
misuse) of coordinating conjunctions on the TLC, Study 3 developed a syntax-level 
“compensation hypothesis” for explaining why H.M. overused coordinating conjunctions 
relative to controls in Study 1. Present results suggested that (a) frontal mechanisms for 
retrieving word-, phrase-, and propositional-categories are intact in H.M., unlike in 
category-specific aphasia, (b) using his intact retrieval mechanisms, H.M. has developed a 
never-previously-observed proposition-level free association strategy to compensate for the 
hippocampal region damage that has impaired his mechanisms for encoding novel 
linguistic structures, and (c) H.M.’s overuse of proper names warrants further research. 
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1. Introduction 
For many years, researchers assumed that the speech production of amnesic H.M. was intact  
(see e.g., [1]). However, closer inspection in recent studies indicated abnormalities in how H.M. 
responded to conversational questions. An example is (1), an excerpt from a conversation with 
Marslen-Wilson [2] about a lay teacher who took over one of H.M.’s classes in a Catholic  
grade school:  
(1). H.M.: (in response to the question: Why did the lay teacher take over the class?) “Uh 
… so that they took … well ... she … I say took over, and what I mean it as ... that, as the 
kids progressed then they were able to … uh … they’d gone to a lay teacher … and they’d 
seen the nuns around, so when they moved to the grade, next grade, they would … they 
would naturally … uh … more eased ... with being with the ... uh … nuns than being 
scared … they were going in there as young kids, they’d be scared, right off in a way ... but 
they see them around and understand them more”. 
H.M.’s response in (1) seems to suggest that the lay teacher took over his class because the pupils 
would be less fearful with a lay teacher rather than a nun leading the class. However, seeing nuns 
around, the pupils would become accustomed to them, so that rather than remaining scared, they would 
feel more at ease when a nun led their next class.  
If this response description is accurate, numerous uncorrected errors in (1) obscured H.M.’s 
intended meaning. For example, in “they would naturally … uh … more eased ... with being with the 
… uh ... nuns than being scared”, H.M. omitted the verb (be or feel in would naturally feel more 
eased), he omitted a coordinating conjunction (presumably rather in rather than being scared), and he 
substituted a neologism “more eased” for more at ease or more accustomed. Then, in “what I mean it 
as that...”, H.M. substituted first “it” and then “as” for is, phonological errors that distorted his 
intended output: what I mean is that. 
Three aspects of H.M.’s uncorrected errors in (1) are noteworthy. First, such errors are 
representative rather than exceptional aspects of H.M.’s speech: In well controlled experiments, H.M. 
has produced: (a) reliably more uncorrected word and phrase omissions than memory-normal controls, 
as in examples (2)–(4) from MacKay, James, Hadley, and Fogler [3]; (b) reliably more sequencing 
errors (transpositions, anticipations, and preservations of words and phrases) than memory-normal 
controls [3], and (c) reliably more neologisms in word reading [4], naming objects on the Boston 
Naming Test [5] and other tasks [6].  
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(2). H.M.: “He’s talking on the to somebody” (omission of the word phone in: He’s talking 
on the phone to somebody). 
(3). H.M.: “There must be a street in between. Because he’s in his office” (omission of the 
phrase those buildings and his building in: There must be a street in between those 
buildings and his building because he’s in his office). 
(4). H.M.: “And you can’t tell exactly what it is she’s saying about him. Picture or what” 
(omission of whether because of the in: And you can’t tell exactly what it is she’s saying 
about him, whether because of the picture or what). 
Second, category-specific aphasics sometimes produce errors that resemble H.M.’s, an observation 
that raises two important questions: Do H.M.’s language production deficits relative to controls in 
Corkin [7], MacKay, Burke et al. [6], MacKay and James [4,8], MacKay, James, and Hadley [9], 
MacKay et al. [3], MacKay, James, Taylor, and Marian [10], and MacKay, Stewart, and Burke [11] 
reflect a type of agrammatism? And does the possible or incipient left hemisphere damage suggested in 
Corkin, Amaral, González, Johnson, and Hyman [12] explain H.M.’s language deficits more 
parsimoniously than his hippocampal region damage? 
Third, because the field has recognized the theoretical significance of speech errors since  
Lashley [13], why did the many researchers interacting informally with H.M. since then overlook his 
aphasia-like errors and assume that his language skills were “normal” or even “erudite” (see [14])?  
Because these aphasia-linked questions provided the initial impetus for the present research, we first 
describe the nature of category-specific aphasia and its implications for the retrieval mechanisms 
underlying normal everyday word, phrase, and sentence production.  
1.1. Category-Specific Aphasia: Implications for Word Retrieval Mechanisms  
Pure and compound category-specific aphasia suggest that the mechanisms underlying word 
retrieval are category-specific. Agrammatic patients with “pure” category-specific aphasia consistently 
omit or fail to produce words in some lexical categories but not others, although the spared versus 
impaired lexical categories vary from patient to patient, with some patients producing, e.g., nouns but 
not verbs, and others producing verbs but not nouns (see [15–33]).  
Examples (5a,b) and (6a–c) illustrate pure category-specific aphasia via transcribed excerpts from 
three famous aphasics who we will simply label X, Y, and Z. Example (5a) is aphasic X’s 
ungrammatical description of the well-known cookie theft picture in Goodglass and Kaplan ([34], 
p. 76), and for comparison, (5b) is a model or error-free description of the same picture. Note that 
aphasic X produced a main verb (fall over) and several nouns (jar, chair, and water), but failed to 
produce other lexical categories seen in (5b), e.g., pronouns (she, her), determiners (a, the), auxiliary 
verbs (is in is trying and is standing), and prepositions (in, onto).  
(5a). Broca’s Aphasic X ([34], p. 76): “Cookie jar … fall over … chair … water …  
empty … ov … ov … (Expt.: “overflow?”) Yeah.”  
(5b). Model cookie theft description: A woman is in her kitchen doing dishes. She does not 
notice the boy and girl behind her nor the water flowing out of the sink onto the floor in 
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front of her. The boy is trying to get cookies from a jar high up on a shelf and give one to 
the girl. He is standing on a stool that is about to fall over.  
Examples (6a) and (6b) illustrate how aphasics Y and Z retold the familiar fox and crow fable, and 
(6c) is a model description for comparison. Note that unlike aphasic X, aphasic Y produced 
determiners (the), but did not produce several other lexical categories seen in (6c): present participles 
(opening, dropping) and infinitives (to trick and to steal). However, unlike aphasics X and Y, aphasic 
Z produced present participles (singing), but failed to produce a main verb, an essential lexical 
category in grammatical sentences.  
(6a). Broca’s aphasic Y ([35], p. 38): Well … well … the same thing is s-smart everything, 
smart … and the brain, OK. 
(6b). Broca’s aphasic Z ([36], p. 64): King … Singing … Singing loud … Meat. Perfect! 
(6c). Model fable description: The fox uses flattery to trick the crow into opening its mouth 
and dropping its cheese for the fox to steal.  
Of course, category-specific aphasia is seldom pure, and compound category-specific aphasics 
exhibit sequencing and phonological as well as lexical deficits: Besides omitting specific lexical 
categories, compound category-specific aphasics typically misorder words, omit and/or misorder 
phonological units, and produce neologisms or jargon for once familiar words (see, e.g., [37–40]).  
Together, pure and compound category-specific aphasia suggest that category-specific activating 
mechanisms retrieve the sequence of phrases in sentences, words in phrases, and phonological units in 
words, and can suffer damage that differs from patient to patient (for detailed language production 
theories sharing this type of category-specific activating mechanism for retrieving word, phrase and 
phonological units, see [41], pp. 14–61; [4,6,8–10]). Thus, aphasic X produced pronouns, determiners, 
auxiliary verbs, and prepositions, but no nouns or verbs in (5a), suggesting selective damage involving 
category-specific retrieval mechanisms for activating nouns and verbs, but not pronouns, determiners, 
auxiliary verbs, or prepositions. By contrast, aphasic Y produced present participles and infinitives but 
not determiners in (6a), suggesting selective damage involving category-specific retrieval mechanisms 
for activating determiners, but not present participles and infinitives. Aphasic Z produced main verbs 
but not present participles in (6b), suggesting selective damage involving category-specific retrieval 
mechanisms for activating present participles, but not main verbs.  
1.2. Speech Error Regularities: Further Evidence for Category-Specific Retrieval 
Three well-established speech error phenomena known as the lexical class, syntactic class, and 
phonological class regularities further support the hypothesis that category-specific mechanisms 
activate the sequence of phrase, word, and phonological units in normal everyday speech production. 
Table 1 illustrates these regularities for 10 classical types of speech errors. Under the lexical class 
regularity, words substituted in error virtually always belong to the same lexical class as the intended 
word (see, e.g., [41], pp. 44–61). For example, verbs substitute in error for intended verbs and not for 
common nouns or determiners; prepositions substitute in error for intended prepositions and not for 
proper names or auxiliary verbs; and adjectives substitute in error for intended adjectives and not for 
conjunctions or pronouns. An example from Burke and Shafto [42] concretely illustrates this lexical 
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class regularity: The speaker (George Bush) intended to say Take the guns out of the hands of people, 
but instead said, “Take the hands out of the guns of people,” where a noun later in the intended 
sequence (hands) substituted an earlier one (guns), and vice versa. As this typical example illustrates, 
the speaker twice retrieved the wrong word from the right category, leaving intact the overall sequence 
of lexical categories in his sentence plan.  
Table 1. Classical types of everyday speech errors and sequential class regularities: 
Definitions and examples. 
Error Level and Type Definition Examples 
Types of phonological sequencing errors 
Phonological 
transpositions, exchanges, 
or Spoonerisms 
Two speech sounds swap 
positions in the same or different 
words in a sentence 
left hemisphere→“heft lemisphere” 
well made→“mell wade” 
Phonological 
anticipations 
An upcoming speech sound 
occurs earlier in a word or 
sentence 
a reading list→“a leading list” 
paddle tennis→“taddle tennis” 
Phonological 
perseverations 
An earlier speech sound reoccurs 
later in a word or sentence 
escorting→“escorking” 
Types of sequencing errors involving words and phrases 
Word anticipations b 
An upcoming word or morpheme 
replaces an earlier one in a 
sentence 
ministers in the church→“churches…” 
Are you going to be in town on June 22nd 
→“Are you going to be on town…” 
Phrase transpositions, 
exchanges, or 
Spoonerisms 
Two phrases in an intended 
sentence swap positions 
If you stick around you’ll meet him 
→“If you meet him you’ll stick around” 
I have to smoke a cigarette with my coffee 
→“I have to smoke my coffee with a cigarette” 
Types of paradigmatic (non-sequential) errors involving words and phrases 
Word additions b 
An unintended word or 
morpheme is added in an intended 
sentence 
is wasting away resources 
→“is wasting away of resources” a 
I regret having to inform 
→“I regret for having to inform” a 
Word substitutions 
An unintended word or 
morpheme substitutes an intended 
word or morpheme 
the native values→“the native vowels” 
pay be check→“pay by rent” 
Word-level omissions b 
An intended word is omitted in 
the sentence produced 
as much as a surgeon’s knife 
→“as much a surgeon’s knife” a 
Word blends 
Two context-appropriate words 
become “fused” together 
hilarity/hysterics→“hilarics” a 
swish/swizzle→“swishle” a 
Phrase blends 
Two context-appropriate phrases 
become fused together 
Whoever he is/whatever his name is 
→“Whoever his name is” 
I’m going to mainly point out/talk about 
→“I’m going to mainly point about” 
Intended utterances are in italics. a indicates examples from [43]; all other examples are from [44]. b indicates examples 
irrelevant to the lexical, syntactic, or phonological class regularity; all other examples obey these sequential class regularities. 
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Under the syntactic class regularity, one phrase substitutes in error for another in the same syntactic 
class: Noun phrases virtually always substitute in error for intended noun phrases rather than for, say, 
verb phrases, and verb phrases virtually always substitute in error for intended verb phrases rather 
than, say, propositions or prepositional phrases. By way of example (from [44]), We have a computer 
in our laboratory misproduced as “We have our laboratory in a computer” obeys the syntactic class 
regularity because the two interchanged phrases (in bold) belong to the same syntactic class (noun 
phrase; see Table 1). 
Under the phonological class regularity, phonological units virtually always substitute in error for 
intended phonological units in the same syllabic position: Syllable-initial consonants substitute with 
intended syllable-initial consonants rather than, say, vowels or syllable-final consonants, and  
syllable-final consonants substitute with intended syllable-final consonants rather than, say, vowels 
(see, e.g., [45]). By way of example (from [13]), dear old queen misproduced as “queer old dean” 
obeys the phonological class regularity because both interchanged consonants (in bold) are  
syllable-initial (see Table 1). 
The “sequential class regularity” (a concept encompassing the lexical, syntactic, and phonological 
class regularities, together with analogous regularities in everyday actions) represents the most general 
phenomenon established to date in production studies (see [41], pp. 44–61) and applies to 
transpositions, anticipations, perseverations, blends, and paradigmatic errors involving phrases, words, 
and phonological units (see Table 1 for definitions and examples). 
The sequential class regularity also carries important theoretical implications. One is that direct 
associative links between specific phrases, words, or speech sounds cannot explain how we activate or 
retrieve phrases, words, and speech sounds in proper order when we do, and in improper order when 
we make sequencing errors (as [13] correctly noted). Another implication is that the activating 
mechanisms for retrieving phrases, words, and speech sounds (in proper or improper order) must be 
category-specific. For example, anticipation errors must occur when an intended or pre-planned 
phrase, word, or speech sound is less “primed” or “readied for activation” (Lashley’s original terms) 
than an upcoming phrase, word, or speech sound in the same sequential category when their shared 
category-specific activating mechanism is applied. As a result, intended and erroneously anticipated 
phrases, words, or speech sounds are constrained to belong to the same sequential category  
(for detailed theoretical accounts of sequential class regularities, see, e.g., [41], pp. 44–61; [46]).  
1.3. Does H.M. Exhibit Category-Specific Aphasia? [47] 
Under the category-specific aphasia hypothesis, H.M.’s language production deficits resemble 
category-specific aphasia (either pure or compound), with impaired retrieval and sequencing of some 
but not all lexical categories (e.g., nouns), some but not all syntactic categories (e.g., noun phrases), 
and perhaps also some but not all phonological categories (e.g., syllable-final consonants). The 
category-specific aphasia hypothesis does not specify which types or how many category-specific 
activating mechanisms have been damaged versus spared in H.M. However, if H.M. more often omits 
and/or misorders words in some categories relative to memory-normal controls, the activating 
mechanisms governing those categories must be impaired under the category-specific aphasia hypothesis.  
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Conversely, if H.M. produces units in some categories with no more omission and/or order errors 
than memory-normal controls, the corresponding category-specific activating mechanisms must be 
intact under the category-specific aphasia hypothesis. For example, if H.M. omits and/or misorders 
nouns no more often than memory-normal controls, then his category-specific mechanism for 
retrieving nouns must be intact.  
Consistent with the category-specific aphasia hypothesis, neuroanatomical and theoretical 
considerations suggest that H.M.’s speech may exhibit selective impairment, reflecting damage to some 
but not all category-specific mechanisms for retrieving words and phrases (as in category-specific 
aphasia). First, H.M.’s lesion could in principle have impaired many category-specific activating 
mechanisms because English has eight major lexical categories (nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, 
pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections), each of which has several subcategories  
(e.g., common versus proper nouns). Second, some of H.M.’s category-specific activating mechanisms 
are probably intact because of the fractional nature of his brain damage (see [12]): Except for the 
amygdala (which triggers emotional reactions), H.M.’s bilateral lesion did not completely destroy the 
hippocampus or any other hippocampal region structure that could in principle house category-specific 
activating mechanisms for retrieving words, phrases, and speech sounds. 
2. Studies 1–3 in Overview  
The present research consisted of three studies. Study 1 examined how often H.M. and  
memory-normal controls used 21 lexical categories and one syntactic category (noun phrases) on the 
Test of Language Competence (TLC) adapted from Wiig and Secord [48] and administered in  
MacKay et al. [9]. If H.M.’s language production deficits reflect category-specific aphasia, we 
expected that H.M. would reliably underuse some lexical or syntactic categories relative to the controls.  
Study 2 followed up on a curious finding in Study 1: H.M. used proper names (e.g., David) reliably 
more often than the TLC controls, but he used no lexical category reliably less often. To determine 
whether H.M.’s overuse of proper names was specific to speech and/or the TLC, Study 2A (spoken 
responses) and Study 2B (written responses) compared how often H.M. and carefully matched 
memory-normal controls used proper names when answering episodic memory questions about early 
childhood experiences. 
Study 3 followed up on another curious finding in Study 1: H.M. reliably overused coordinating 
conjunctions relative to TLC controls. To understand this result, Study 3 analyzed in detail how H.M. 
and carefully matched controls used (and misused) coordinating conjunctions on the TLC, with results 
that suggested a “compensation hypothesis” for explaining H.M.’s overuse of coordinating 
conjunctions and other structures.  
2.1. Participants 
Participants in Studies 1–3 were H.M. and healthy, memory-normal controls recruited through their 
places of employment in clerical or physical plant positions. The controls were paid for participating 
and were carefully matched with H.M. for highest educational degree (high school), native language 
(English), background (semi-skilled labor), age at time of test, and mean verbal and performance IQ 
scores. H.M.’s combined verbal and performance IQ was 116 at age 44 and 112 at age 71–72.  
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H.M.’s 1953 sub-orbital suction surgery destroyed virtually the entire amygdaloid complex and 
partially destroyed several other hippocampal region structures [49]. Partially intact were the 
entorhinal cortex, the dentate gyrus, the subicular complex, and the posterior half (approximately) of 
the hippocampal body (although its functional status was never determined). Completely intact were 
H.M.’s neocortex (including Brodmann’s areas 44/45), temporal stem, parahippocampal cortex, and 
ventral perirhinal cortex except for where thin metal suction tubes passed bilaterally through his 
temporal poles [12].  
Later in H.M.’s life (1992–1993), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) in Corkin et al. [12] indicated 
bilateral cerebellar damage (probably due to long-term dilantin use), but cerebellar involvement in 
H.M.’s language deficits described here is unlikely because of four types of evidence reviewed in 
MacKay and Johnson [50]. The same MRI study suggested (without data from same-age memory 
normal controls) “possible” and at most “minimal” damage to lateral temporal neocortex.  
Later still (2002–2005), more sophisticated MRI data discounted Alzheimer-related degeneration 
relative to four memory-normal controls (unmatched with H.M. for IQ, education, or background) but 
suggested vascular changes and cortical thinning with unknown relations to behavior [51]. These 
cortical and vascular changes probably followed the present studies (1999), but could have originated 
earlier (without detection via the relatively insensitive MRI technology in [12]). Possible causes of 
these cortical and vascular changes include (a) an interaction between normal aging and H.M.’s 1953 
lesion (see [4]); and (b) transneuronal dendritic degeneration triggered by his hippocampal lesion, a 
common occurrence in older adults (see [52,53]).  
2.2. Database and Procedures: Studies 1 and 3 
Because the database for Studies 1 and 3 was the full transcript of participants’ responses in 
MacKay et al. [9], a brief review of their methods and results is in order. The task, a modified version 
of the TLC, consisted of one practice and 20 experimental trials. The goal on each trial was to create a 
single grammatical sentence that accurately described a picture and included two or three target words 
typed below the picture.  
Based on stimulus ratings of 10 judges in a preliminary study, MacKay et al. [9] categorized the 
TLC word-picture stimuli as familiar versus unfamiliar. The judges rated as familiar, stimuli depicting 
commonly encountered situations, and containing target words that participated in familiar clichés for 
describing the pictures; and they rated as unfamiliar, stimuli depicting relatively novel situations and 
containing target words not part of familiar clichés for describing the pictures.  
For unfamiliar stimuli, H.M. included reliably fewer target words than the controls, and described 
the pictures reliably less accurately, less grammatically, and less completely than the controls (for the 
criteria used in classifying descriptions as grammatical versus ungrammatical and complete versus 
incomplete, see [9]). The responses to an unfamiliar TLC stimulus in (7a,b) illustrate H.M.’s deficits. 
A general description of the word-picture stimulus appears in (7), followed by H.M.’s description in 
(7a) and a typical control participant’s in (7b). Note that H.M. described (7) inaccurately (e.g., there 
was no “lady” in the picture) and omitted the target word leg (see 7a), whereas the control participant 
accurately described the picture and included both target words (see 7b). 
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(7). DESCRIPTION OF AN UNFAMILIAR WORD-PICTURE STIMULUS:  
Scene: A sheer rock cliff in a forest. 
Protagonists: Three men, one climbing up the rock face by hand, one pointing up at the 
climber and talking to the third man, who is listening. 
Target words: fall, leg 
(7a). H.M.: “David wanted him to fall and to see what lady’s using to pull himself up 
besides his hands.”  
(7b). Typical Control: “If I fall and break my leg that’s going, not going to be good.” 
However, H.M.’s deficits were selective: For familiar word-picture stimuli in MacKay et al. [9], 
H.M. and the controls did not differ in accuracy, completeness, or target word inclusion. Moreover, 
H.M.’s deficits were graded rather than all-or-none: Re-presenting the same picture reduced without 
completely eliminating H.M.’s deficits, and so did asking him to try again (up to seven times) when he 
failed to include all of the target words (see the complete transcript of all within-trial utterances of 
H.M. and the experimenter for each word-picture stimulus in the supplementary materials). H.M.’s 
initial response (8a) and final response (8b) for the word-picture stimulus described in (8) illustrate this 
effect of repetition. Note that like the typical controls in (8c,d), H.M. produced all three target words 
without errors on his final but not initial try.  
(8). DESCRIPTION OF A FAMILIAR WORD-PICTURE STIMULUS:  
Scene: A sidewalk at a street intersection with a traffic light that reads, “Don’t walk”. 
Protagonists: A small boy, age about four years old, his father, and his older brother. 
Action: The small boy is holding his father’s hand and listens attentively to what his father 
is saying (presumably about the “Don’t walk” sign). His older brother looks on. 
Target words: before, first, across 
(8a). H.M. (initial response): “Before at first you cross across.” 
(8b). H.M. (final response): “Before you cross the street you have to look both ways first.” 
(8c). Typical Control (sole response): “First they waited before walking across the street.” 
(8d). Typical Control (sole response): “And the man is telling the little boy that he must 
look first before he crosses the street.” 
2.3. Statistical Conventions: Studies 1–3 
All statistical analyses followed three non-arbitrary conventions justified in detail in the 
supplementary materials: For meaningful statistical comparisons, differences between H.M. and the 
controls in absolute scores had to equal or exceed 4.0; when the control standard deviation (SD) was 
0.0, the difference between H.M. and the controls was 6.0 SDs (rather than ∞); and only differences 
between H.M. and the controls in excess of 2.0 SDs were considered reliable. 
3. Study 1: Retrieval of Lexical and Syntactic Categories: H.M. versus Controls 
Study 1 examined whether H.M. underused one syntactic category (noun phrases) and any of  
21 lexical categories relative to memory-normal controls on the modified TLC administered in 
MacKay et al. [9]. We first determined the noun phrases (Study 1B) and lexical categories of each 
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word in the participants’ responses (Study 1A), and compared the use frequency of each for H.M. 
versus the controls. If H.M. suffered from category-specific aphasia, we predicted that he would 
underuse some lexical or syntactic categories but not others relative to the controls.  
3.1. Study 1A: Retrieval of Lexical Categories 
Study 1A examined how often participants on the TLC used words in 21 lexical categories, 
including nouns (common and proper), pronouns, verbs (transitive, intransitive, and auxiliary), noun 
modifiers (indefinite articles, definite articles, canonical adjectives, demonstrative adjectives, and 
possessive adjectives), verb modifiers (canonical adverbs, time adverbs, and frequency adverbs), 
prepositions (canonical prepositions, place prepositions, and time prepositions), conjunctions 
(coordinating, subordinating, and correlative), and interjections. 
3.1.1. Method 
3.1.1.1. Participants 
The participants were H.M. at age 72 and eight controls who did not differ reliably from H.M. in 
mean age (70; SD = 4.6) or mean combined verbal and performance IQ score (113; SD = 9.67).  
3.1.1.2. Database and Procedures 
The database was the full set of transcribed responses of H.M. and the controls on the TLC (see [9] 
for detailed transcription procedures). The goal on each trial was to accurately describe a picture using 
two or three pre-specified target words in a single grammatical sentence, and a response was defined as 
a string of words bounded by trial onset, trial offset, or a substantive comment from the experimenter 
(e.g., a request to try again). We chose this database as providing more useable data for lexical category 
analyses than the smaller MacKay et al. [9] database, which included only H.M.’s best response on 
each TLC trial. H.M.’s responses in the present database are shown in the supplementary materials, 
together with a model (complete and error-free) description for the practice and experimental stimuli.  
To prepare the database for lexical category analyses, we edited out irrelevant aspects of the 
responses, including self-corrected errors and error markers (e.g., “no”, “I mean”, “sorry”, “um”, “er”, 
and “not”), experimenter comments (e.g., “OK”, “good”, and “mm hm”), on-line revisions or 
repetitions (e.g., “bus ... school bus”), interjections and other common dysfluencies (e.g., “um” and 
“uh”), word and phrase repetitions, false starts, and extraneous or off topic comments (e.g., “it isn’t 
pointed out here what it is”, and “no that doesn’t work”). These edited-out aspects became part of the 
speech error analyses in MacKay, Johnson and Hadley [54].  
As main analyses, we tabulated the lexical category of each word in the database using the sentence 
context together with the lexical class specifications in Dictionary.com. We then computed the use 
frequency for common nouns (e.g., enemy, uncle, goal), proper names (e.g., Canada, Sandy), transitive 
verbs (e.g., toss, love), intransitive verbs (e.g., exist, stink), auxiliary verbs (e.g., could, should), 
canonical adjectives (e.g., diligent, red, short), demonstrative adjectives (e.g., this, those), possessive 
adjectives (e.g., your, her), adverbs of time (e.g., yesterday, soon), adverbs of frequency (e.g., often, 
sometimes), pronouns (e.g., she, we, his, yours, himself), canonical prepositions (e.g., of, for), 
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prepositions of time (e.g., at 6:00, for a year), prepositions of place (e.g., at my place, in the box), 
coordinating conjunctions (e.g., and, or, but), subordinating conjunctions (e.g., although, after, 
because), indefinite articles (e.g., a/an), and definite articles (e.g., the).  
3.1.2. Results and Discussion 
3.1.2.1. Absolute Use Frequencies 
Table 2 shows absolute use frequencies of lexical categories in the full set of transcribed responses 
for H.M. and the controls (means and SDs). H.M. and the controls both used 19 of the lexical 
categories, but the controls used correlative conjunctions (e.g., either/or and both/and), whereas H.M. 
did not, and H.M. used proper names (e.g., Melanie, David, and Gary), whereas the controls did not 
(see Table 2). However, H.M. used 955 words overall versus a mean of 233 (SD = 120.88) for the 
controls, a reliable 5.98 SD difference that rendered absolute use frequencies unsuitable for statistical 
analysis and called for the analyses of relative use frequency examined next. 
Table 2. Absolute and relative use frequency of lexical categories for all words in Study 1. 
General 
Lexical 
Category 
Specific Lexical 
Category 
Examples 
Absolute Use 
Frequency 
Relative Use Frequency 
H.M. Controls H.M. 
Controls 
Mean 
Controls 
SD 
Frequency 
Difference 
Scores in 
SDs 
Nouns 
Common Nouns 
enemy, 
uncle, 
goal 
108 33.40 11.31 14.20 3.21 −0.90 
Proper Nouns 
Canada, 
Sandy 
7 0.00 0.73 0 0 6.00 * 
Pronouns Pronouns 
she, we, 
his, yours 
146 28.40 15.29 11.98 3.32 1.00 
Nominal 
Modifiers 
Indefinite 
Articles 
a/an 7 4.80 0.73 1.99 1.62 −0.78 a 
Definite Articles the 26 12.80 2.72 5.78 4.69 −0.65 
Canonical 
Adjectives 
diligent, 
red, short 
61 17.20 6.39 8.50 2.91 −0.73 
Demonstrative 
Adjectives 
this, those 37 6.80 3.87 2.82 0.98 1.07 
Possessive 
Adjectives 
your, her 9 3.00 0.94 1.20 0.74 −0.35 
Verbs 
Main Verbs: 
Transitive 
toss, love 101 19.60 10.58 9.18 2.20 0.64 
Main Verbs: 
Intransitive 
exist, stink 125 27.60 13.06 11.87 1.98 0.62 
Auxiliary Verbs 
could, 
should 
65 24.20 6.81 9.82 2.68 −1.12 
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Table 2. Cont. 
Verb 
Modifiers 
Canonical Adverbs really, not, only 98 19 10.26 7.81 2.69 0.91 
Adverbs of Time yesterday, soon 5 1.00 0.52 0.66 0.64 −0.21 
Adverbs of 
Frequency 
often, 
sometimes 
1 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.21 0.04 a 
Prepositions 
Canonical 
Prepositions 
of, with 17 6.8 1.78 2.55 1.30 −0.59 
Prepositions of 
Time 
at 6:00, for a 
year 
3 0.60 0.31 0.42 0.71 −0.15 a 
Prepositions of 
Place 
at my place, in 
the box 
25 5.20 2.62 1.83 1.16 0.68 
Conjunctions 
Coordinating 
Conjunctions 
and, or, but 68 9.60 7.12 3.92 0.93 3.45 * 
Subordinating 
Conjunctions 
although, after, 
because 
32 9.00 3.35 3.46 1.33 −0.08 
Correlative 
Conjunctions 
either/or, 
both/and 
0 1.60 0.00 1.09 1.42 −0.77 a 
Interjections Interjections well, oh 14 1.8 1.47 0.84 0.59 1.06 
N/%   955 232.60 99.96 100.02   
Relative frequency difference scores are the relative use frequency for H.M. minus the mean for controls (in SDs).  
* indicates a statistically reliable difference score; a indicates differences in absolute Ns too small for meaningful 
statistical analysis. 
3.1.2.2. Relative Use Frequencies 
Table 2 shows relative frequencies by lexical category for H.M. and the controls (means and SDs), 
with relative use frequency calculated as the absolute use frequency for a lexical category divided by 
overall size of a participant’s edited transcript multiplied by 100. Also shown in Table 2 are the 
relative frequency difference scores, calculated as the relative use frequency for H.M. minus the mean 
for the controls divided by the control SD for each lexical category. Relative frequency difference 
scores ranged from −1.12 to +6.0 SDs but were never meaningfully greater for the memory-normal 
controls than H.M. for any lexical category: Although the controls used relatively more correlative 
conjunctions than H.M., the difference in absolute N for H.M. (0) versus the control mean (1.60) was 
too small for meaningful analysis. Absolute Ns were likewise too small for meaningful analyses of 
relative use frequencies for indefinite articles, prepositions of time, and adverbs of frequency  
(see Table 2).  
However, relative use frequencies for two lexical categories were reliably greater for H.M. than the 
controls: coordinating conjunctions (a 3.45 SD difference) and proper names (a 6.0 SD difference by 
convention), findings reminiscent of H.M.’s overuse of cliché phrases in MacKay, Burke et al. [6]. To 
rule out H.M.’s reduced target word use as a factor in these results, we reanalyzed the database 
excluding the target words, and relative use frequency in this second analysis was again reliably 
greater for H.M. than the controls for both proper names (6.0 SDs by convention) and coordinating 
conjunctions (2.07 SDs; see Table 3).  
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Table 3. Absolute and relative use frequency of Study 1 lexical categories, excluding target words. 
General 
Lexical 
Category 
Specific 
Lexical 
Category 
Examples 
Absolute Use 
Frequency 
Relative Use Frequency 
H.M. Controls H.M. 
Controls 
Mean 
Controls 
SD 
Frequency 
Difference 
Scores in SDs 
Nouns 
Common Nouns 
enemy, 
uncle, goal 
81 28.60 9.44 14.14 3.56 −1.32 
Proper Nouns 
Canada, 
Sandy 
7 0.00 0.82 0.00 0 6.00 * 
Pronouns Pronouns 
she, we, 
his, yours 
146 27.6 17.02 13.97 4.58 0.66 
Nominal 
Modifiers 
Indefinite 
Articles 
a/an 7 4.80 0.82 2.43 2.12 −0.76 
Definite 
Articles 
the 26 12.80 3.03 6.77 5.36 −0.69 
Canonical 
Adjectives 
diligent, 
red, short 
44 10.20 5.13 5.63 1.91 −0.23 
Demonstrative 
Adjectives 
this, those 37 6.80 4.31 3.39 1.26 0.73 
Possessive 
Adjectives 
your, her 9 3.00 1.05 1.40 0.90 −0.39 
Verbs 
Main Verbs: 
Transitive 
toss, love 95 17.60 11.07 9.40 1.78 0.94 
Main Verbs: 
Intransitive 
exist, stink 111 21.80 12.94 10.78 2.15 1.01 
Auxiliary Verbs 
could, 
should 
65 23.20 7.58 11.19 2.92 −1.24 
Verb 
Modifiers 
Canonical 
Adverbs 
really, not, 
only 
88 18.40 10.26 9.01 3.43 0.36 
Adverbs of 
Time 
yesterday, 
soon 
2 0.20 0.23 0.07 0.16 a 
Adverbs of 
Frequency 
often, 
sometimes 
1 0.20 0.12 0.11 0.24 a 
Prepositions 
Canonical 
Prepositions 
of, with 17 6.60 1.98 2.91 1.63 −0.57 
Prepositions of 
Time 
at 6:00, for 
a year 
1 0 0.12 0.00 0.00 a 
Prepositions of 
Place 
at my 
place, in 
the box 
24 4.80 2.80 1.96 1.15 0.72 
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Table 3. Cont. 
Conjunctions 
Coordinating 
Conjunctions 
and, or, but 58 7.40 6.76 2.92 1.85 2.07 * 
Subordinating 
Conjunctions 
although, 
after, 
because 
25 5.60 2.91 2.19 1.63 0.45 
Correlative 
Conjunctions 
either/or, 
both/and 
0 0.80 0.00 0.70 0.91 a 
Interjections Interjections well, oh 14 1.8 1.63 1.03 0.75 0.80 
N/%   858 202.20 100.02 100.00   
* indicates a statistically reliable difference score; a indicates absolute Ns too small for meaningful statistical analysis. 
In summary, the controls exhibited reliably greater relative use frequency than H.M. for no lexical 
category, contrary to the category-specific aphasia hypothesis, and neither sample size nor target word 
inclusion constrained this conclusion. However, three puzzling results in Study 1 warranted further 
research: H.M.’s reliable overuse of proper names and coordinating conjunctions relative to the 
controls, and his non-use of correlative conjunctions, e.g., either/or, and both/and (an ambiguous result 
because differences in absolute Ns for H.M. versus the controls for this lexical category were too small 
for meaningful analysis).  
Understanding these puzzling results was a primary goal in Studies 2–3 and MacKay et al. [54]. 
Study 2 examined whether H.M. overused proper names in new tasks administered at a younger age, 
and MacKay et al. analyzed H.M.’s use and misuse of proper names and correlative conjunctions in 
detail. Study 3 took parallel steps to understand H.M.’s Study 1 overuse of coordinating conjunctions 
by analyzing his use and misuse of coordinating conjunctions in detail.  
3.2. Study 1B: Retrieval Frequency of Noun Phrases: H.M. versus the Controls 
Study 1B resembled Study 1A except that a syntactic structure was the unit of analysis. By 
definition, syntactic structures combine one or more words to form a phrase or proposition, and Study 
1B analyzed how often H.M. and the controls retrieved noun phrases, a major syntactic structure in 
English. In standard definitions [55–58], noun phrases combine a noun with modifiers or 
complements, as in that important point, a noun phrase with head noun point and two modifiers: a 
demonstrative adjective (that) and a canonical adjective (important).  
The question in Study 1B was whether H.M. uses noun phrases with lower relative frequency than 
memory-normal controls, as in a subclass of category-specific aphasia where the ability to construct or 
retrieve some syntactic structures but not others is impaired. By way of illustration, aphasic Y in (6a) 
used noun phrases (e.g., the same thing, and the brain) and verb phrases (e.g., is smart) but not the 
complement structures expected in normal descriptions of the fox and crow fable, e.g., for the fox to 
steal and to trick the crow in (6c), which suggests impairment in constructing or retrieving 
complement structures but not noun phrases or verb phrases.  
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3.2.1. Method 
Participants and procedures were identical to Study 1 except that we used the smaller TLC database 
of MacKay et al. ([9]; see the supplementary materials) because it contained only H.M.’s best response 
on any given TLC trial, thereby reducing the number of uncorrected grammatical errors that could 
complicate the syntactic structure analyses in Study 1B. 
Study 1B tabulated all multi-word noun phrases in this database for H.M. and the controls, ignoring 
errors (see [54] for detailed error analyses) and single-word noun phrases (because Study 1 had already 
analyzed single-word usage).  
3.2.2. Results and Discussion 
The mean number of noun phrases per response was 1.72 for H.M. versus 2.21 (SD = 1.38) for the 
controls, a non-reliable 0.36 SD difference. The mean number of words per noun phrase also did not 
differ for H.M. (2.32 words) versus the controls (2.21 words; SD = 0.55), a non-reliable 0.60 SD 
difference. These results indicate that H.M. did not underuse noun phrases relative to the controls, and 
suggest that (a) he did not suffer category-specific aphasia involving noun phrases, and (b) his 
category-specific mechanisms for retrieving noun phrases were intact.  
4. Study 2: Proper Name Use in Answering Episodic Memory Questions 
Study 2 followed up on the reliably greater use of proper names (e.g., Gary) for H.M. than  
memory-normal controls in Study 1. To determine whether this result was specific to the TLC, to 
spoken speech, or to H.M.’s age (72 in Study 1), Study 2 examined H.M.’s proper name use in spoken 
and written episodic memory tasks at age 44 and 71. In both tasks, H.M. and age-matched  
memory-normal controls answered episodic memory questions concerning childhood events, an 
appropriate domain choice because H.M.’s early childhood memories are intact by common 
assumption (see e.g., [59]). However, answers were spoken in Study 2A versus written in Study 2B.  
4.1. Study 2A: H.M.’s Spoken Use of Proper Names at Age 44 
Study 2A used analytic procedures resembling Study 1A to tabulate use frequencies for an 
experimental category (proper names) and a control category (pronouns) in transcripts of spoken 
answers to episodic memory questions concerning childhood events. We chose pronouns as the 
appropriate control category for proper names because (a) proper names and pronouns represent 
equivalent ways of designating a referent, e.g., a person or object, and (b) unlike proper names, 
pronouns did not differ in use frequency for H.M. versus the controls in Study 1. Under the assumption 
that neither task nor age influenced Study 1 results, we expected identical results in Study 2A: reliably 
greater use for the experimental category (proper names) but not the control category (pronouns) for 
H.M. relative to the controls.  
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4.1.1. Method 
4.1.1.1. Participants 
The participants were H.M. at age 44, and seven controls with mean age 45 and combined verbal 
and performance IQ 117.72 (SD = 13.40), a non-reliable 0.10 SD difference relative to H.M.  
4.1.1.2. Materials and Procedures 
The materials were six episodic memory questions from Marslen-Wilson [2], a 182-page transcript 
of conversations between Marslen-Wilson and H.M. at age 44. All six questions addressed childhood 
experiences that occurred prior to age nine, e.g., What is your first or earliest memory? Excluded were 
questions calling for explicit recall of proper names and “follow-up” questions that Marslen-Wilson 
asked about earlier H.M. responses (thereby ensuring comparable response contexts for H.M. and  
the controls). 
Following Marslen-Wilson’s [2] procedures as closely as possible, the controls heard the questions 
in one-on-one conversations with an experimenter in a laboratory setting and their spoken responses 
were tape-recorded and later transcribed (see [9] for transcription procedures). As in Study 1, we then 
tabulated the use frequency of proper names and pronouns from the transcripts.  
4.1.2. Results and Discussion 
The mean number of words per response was 617 for H.M. versus a mean of 244.86 for the controls 
(SD = 116.19), a reliable 3.20 SD difference that called for relative frequency analyses of our  
main results.  
4.1.2.1. Relative Frequency Analyses 
Consistent with Study 1 results, proper names made up 6.48% of H.M.’s words versus a mean of 
2.58% for the controls (SD = 1.48%), a reliable 2.64 SD difference favoring H.M. Example (9a,b) 
illustrates this finding for H.M. and a typical control participant responding to the question “What is 
your first memory?”: The control used no proper name words (see 9b), whereas H.M. used five: 
Hartford, Manchester, South Coventry, and Burnside (see 9a).  
(9). Experimenter question: “What is your first memory, the earliest thing you remember?”  
(9a). H.M.: When I ... tell you that ‘tis ... you see ... may have been ... that was when I was 
going to high school ... that … and ... but before that when I was going to the private 
kindergarten, two houses up, from where I lived, when I went to high school, but the other 
places I lived in Hartford, and Manchester, and then South Coventry ... before coming back 
to (chuckles) Burnside avenue again. 
(9b). Typical control participant: “Oh, way back, uh ... two. I was two because I have seen 
pictures of myself in a snowsuit, and I outgrew it very quickly, but when I was two I wore 
it and when I was two I remember walking in my grandma’s kitchen and pointing up at my 
snowsuit hanging on the kitchen door because I wanted to put it on, and it’s very clear—it 
was light blue.” 
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Also consistent with Study 1 results, pronouns made up 4.86% of H.M.’s words versus a mean of 
4.91% for the controls (SD = 2.00%), a non-reliable difference.  
4.1.2.2. Type and Token Analyses: Pronouns and Proper Names 
To illustrate the distinction between types versus tokens, H.M. retrieved 10 different types of proper 
names overall (Burnside Avenue, Connecticut, East Hartford, Frankie, Hartford, Jimmie Wood, L.T. 
Wood, Manchester, South Coventry, and Spruce Street) and the seven controls retrieved 38 different 
proper name types overall (Bad Peter, Black, Carter, Camp David, Central City, Colorado, Christmas, 
Denver, Drew Bryant, Easter, F-15 fighter, Mrs. Folgers, Germany, Gigantic Cleaners, Harley, 
Halloween, Hitler, Hog Days, Illinois, JFK, Jerry Lewis, Kentucky, Kewanee, Labor Day, Ms. Hanbee, 
New York, Nixon, Pokie, Puyallup, Reagan, SALT I, SALT II, Satan, Saturday, Susan, Tehran, 
Vietnam, Westwood Elementary). However, H.M. retrieved 24 proper name tokens because he repeated 
Burnside Avenue seven times, East Hartford six times, and Hartford once, and the seven controls 
retrieved 52 proper name tokens overall because they repeated Labor Day and New York three times, 
Carter twice, and Denver, Easter, Harley, Hog Days, Jerry Lewis, and Reagan once.  
The present type and token analyses used lexical items rather than words as the unit of analysis. To 
illustrate this distinction, South Coventry represents a single name or lexical item but contains two 
words, so that (9a) contained five proper name words but only four lexical items: Hartford, 
Manchester, Burnside, and South Coventry. After counting the pronoun and proper name types and 
tokens for each participant, we calculated tokens-per-type ratios as a measure of how often participants 
repeated units that they used.  
H.M. used no more pronoun types than the controls, with 6 different pronoun types for H.M. versus 
a mean of 4.17 for the controls (SD = 1.07), a non-reliable 1.71 SD difference. The tokens-per-type 
ratio for pronouns also did not differ for H.M. (5.83) versus the mean for the controls (3.85; 
SD = 2.27), a non-reliable 0.87 SD difference.  
The parallel tokens-per-type analysis for proper names yielded 10 proper name types for H.M. 
versus a mean of 6.33 for the controls (SD = 3.43), a non-reliable 1.07 SD difference. However, the 
tokens-per-type ratio was 2.4 for H.M. versus a mean of 1.09 for the controls (SD = 0.123), a reliable 
10.65 SD difference.  
We repeated our tokens-per-type analyses for pronouns and proper names using relative frequencies 
as the unit of analysis and obtained the same results, ruling out the larger number of words in H.M.’s 
output as a possible explanation for his tendency to repeat proper names. Also ruled out as a factor 
were the topics of the questions because H.M.’s proper name use was usually irrelevant to  
Marslen-Wilson’s questions, reflecting a deliberate topic shift to proper names (see, e.g., 9a).  
In summary, our tokens-per-type analyses indicated that H.M. repeated proper names but not 
pronouns reliably more often than memory-normal controls. This finding again indicates that proper 
names represent a special lexical category for H.M., and calls for qualification of the generalization 
that H.M. has a general tendency to repeat [3,6,11]. Despite repeating a wide range of forms reliably 
more often than memory-normal controls, including familiar stories, paragraphs, sentences, phrases, 
and common clichés, H.M. does not have a general tendency to repeat because he repeated proper 
name types but not pronoun types more often than controls. 
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4.1.2.3. Content Analyses of Proper Name Use 
For participants using four or more proper name types, we analyzed the content of their proper 
names. These analyses revealed two reliable content differences between H.M.’s proper names versus 
the controls’. First, 70% of H.M.’s proper names were place names (e.g., Burnside Avenue, 
Connecticut, East Hartford, Hartford, Manchester, South Coventry, and Spruce Street) versus a mean 
of 23.3% for the controls (SD = 6.11), a reliable 7.64 SD difference. Second, 70% of H.M.’s place 
names were street and city names versus a mean of 13% for the controls. Overall then, 49% of H.M.’s 
proper names were street (e.g., Burnside Avenue, Spruce Street) and city (e.g., East Hartford, 
Hartford, Manchester, and South Coventry) names versus a mean of 3.03% (SD = 6.41) for the 
controls, a reliable 7.17 SD difference.  
Were H.M.’s street names accurately recalled episodic memories or were they imagined or 
fabricated? To illustrate this issue, H.M.’s repeated reference to high school in example (9a) represents 
an unlikely “first childhood memory” because high school by definition falls outside early childhood.  
Although appropriate in some contexts, memory-type and memory-accuracy questions are 
inappropriate in the present context: When comparing the use frequency of equivalent ways to express 
the same concept, here proper names versus pronouns, it matters not whether the basis for use is 
irrelevant discourse, imagined facts or events, or memories for semantic facts versus unique personally 
experienced events.  
4.2. Study 2B: H.M.’s Written Use of Proper Names at Age 71 
Study 2B resembled Study 2A except that the participants were older and answered visually 
presented episodic memory questions in writing rather than speech in order to test whether memory 
factors influenced Study 1 results: With written stimuli and responses, participants needed to recall 
neither the questions nor their answers (as they unfolded), and we expected different results in Study 
2B if these memory factors affected prior results, but the same results (greater proper name use for 
H.M. than the controls) if they did not affect prior results.  
4.2.1. Method 
4.2.1.1. Participants 
The participants were H.M. at age 71, and three controls with mean age 70 (range 67–74) and 
combined verbal and performance IQ 119.1 (SD = 5.02), a non-reliable 1.41 SD difference relative  
to H.M.  
4.2.1.2. Procedures and Materials 
The participants received a five-page booklet with an autobiographical question heading each page, 
followed by the instruction: Write as much as you want in answering the question. It is not necessary 
to fill the entire page. Do not worry about exact spelling.  
The experimenter repeated the instructions and read each question aloud for H.M. but not the 
controls. The questions were: What is your earliest memory? Can you describe any children in your 
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kindergarten class? Can you describe any children in your grade school? Describe any single event 
when you were 7 or younger involving your mother. Describe any single event when you were 7 or 
younger involving your father. Response duration was determined via stopwatch. 
4.2.2. Results and Discussion 
4.2.2.1. Number of Words per Response 
We removed from analyses two questions eliciting one-word and irrelevant responses: H.M. and 
two controls who had not attended kindergarten answered “no” to Can you describe any children in 
your kindergarten class?; and H.M. answered Can you describe any children in your grade school? 
with an irrelevant string of abbreviated proper names (see (10)). In response to experimenter questions 
following (10), H.M. indicated that “MAN.” stood for Manchester; “S.P.S.” for Saint Peter’s School; 
and “HTFD” for Hartford Fire Department, and we decided that including this irrelevant response 
would have biased present results in favor of our hypothesis (greater proper name use for H.M. than 
the controls). 
(10). H.M. (written answer to the question Can you describe any children in your grade 
school? Underlining and punctuation as per the original): MAN. S.P.S. HTFD.  
For the remaining questions, the overall mean number of words per response was 17.67 for H.M. 
versus 26.56 for the controls (SD = 4.44), a reliable 2.00 SD difference that called for relative 
frequency analyses of our main results.  
4.2.2.2. Relative Use Frequency 
Proper names made up 11.32% of the words in H.M.’s responses versus a mean of 1.24% for the 
controls’ (SD = 2.11), a reliable 4.81 SD difference. This replication of earlier results indicated that 
(a) H.M. retrieved proper names with greater-than-normal frequency when written questions and 
responses obviated the need to recall either the questions or his own ongoing responses, and (b) H.M. 
overused proper names in three tasks: answering episodic memory questions about childhood events in 
speech and writing and creating spoken sentences on the TLC (Study 1). 
4.2.2.3. Response Duration 
Mean overall response durations were about 248 s for H.M. versus 100 s (SD = 34) for the controls, 
a reliable 4.35 SD difference attributable in part to H.M.’s cerebellar damage. Because the controls 
produced reliably more words per response than H.M., mean time per word was also reliably longer for 
H.M. than the controls.  
4.2.2.4. Uncorrected Errors 
With misspellings excluded, H.M. produced more uncorrected errors than the controls. H.M.’s 
handwritten response to the question What is your earliest memory? illustrates two such errors (see 
Figure 1): “school grade” instead of grade school, and “where I lived when I lived when I returned to 
high school”, where H.M. presumably failed to cross out when I lived, a noteworthy non-correction 
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because (a) this error rendered his sentence ungrammatical, and (b) H.M. crossed out several lesser 
errors in Figure 1. 
Overall, H.M. produced eight uncorrected word- and phrase-level errors versus a mean of 0.60 for 
the controls (SD = 0.35), a reliable 21.14 SD deficit. This finding extends H.M.’s deficits in correcting 
self-produced errors to written speech and rules out time constraints and problems in recalling his  
just-produced output as causal factors: In Study 2B, there were no time constraints and H.M. could see 
and correct his handwritten responses without having to recall his prior output. 
Figure 1. Handwritten responses to the question What is your earliest memory? with 
proper names italicized in a verbatim transcription. (a) H.M.: “Kindergarten was two 
houses from where I lived when I lived when I returned to high school. First I went to 
school grade in Manchester and High school in Htfd Willimantic + then E.H.” (Htfd 
represents Hartford; E.H. represents East Hartford). (b) Typical control participant: “My 
first doll “Flossie” was given to me by a favorite uncle when I was probably 4 years old”. 
a 
b 
4.2.2.5. Response Coherence 
Although coherence or relevance problems were too infrequent for meaningful statistical analyses, 
H.M. produced several notable examples, such as his reference to high school in Figure 1, which was 
clearly incoherent with the topic, your earliest memory. Because H.M. could have maintained 
coherence by reading the questions and his own written responses in Study 2B, such examples suggest 
that forgetting or memory problems cannot fully explain his basically similar coherence problems in 
MacKay, Burke et al. [6], and MacKay et al. [3,9,10].  
4.2.3. Subsidiary Results: Unusual Abbreviations, Letter Cases, Underlining, and Graphemic Errors 
Graphemic characteristics differed for H.M. versus the controls in two ways: graphemic fluency and 
unusual abbreviations, letter cases, and underlining. Handwriting was more fluent and less error-prone 
for the controls than H.M., a difference attributable to H.M.’s cerebellar damage. For example, in 
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Figure 1, H.M. substituted M for the N in Manchester, and retraced the A in Kindergarten and the O in 
houses, whereas the controls virtually never retraced or misproduced letters.  
Unlike the controls, H.M. also produced unorthodox abbreviations, letter cases, and underlining. 
For example, H.M. abbreviated East Hartford as “E.H.” in Figure 1, perhaps to economize on the 
effort that his cerebellar motor difficulties demanded. However, motor difficulties cannot explain 
H.M.’s capitalization errors and unorthodox use of underlining, as when he underlined the pronoun I 
for no apparent reason, incorrectly capitalized the first H in high school, and failed to capitalize the 
sentence-initial word First in Figure 1, all without correction. By contrast, the controls never produced 
unusual abbreviations, inappropriate case, or inexplicable underlining, a reliable 6.0 SD difference by 
convention (see the typical control response in Figure 1). 
4.3. General Discussion  
H.M.’s overuse of proper names in Studies 1 and 2 has no simple explanation and warrants further 
research. For example, H.M. did not overuse proper names because they are easily retrieved or 
encoded: Proper names are in fact more difficult to encode and retrieve than other types of information 
about people such as their (common noun) occupation (see, e.g., [60–62]). However, based on extensive 
analyses of encoding and retrieval errors on the TLC, MacKay et al. [54] concluded that H.M.’s 
overuse of proper names reflects compensation processes resembling those examined in Study 3.  
5. Study 3: Compensation Underlying H.M.’s Use and Misuse of and 
The question in Study 3 was why H.M. used reliably more coordinating conjunctions than  
memory-normal controls in Study 1. As a first step in addressing this question, we analyzed how often 
participants used various types of coordinating conjunctions on the TLC. To anticipate the results of 
these use frequency analyses, H.M. overused and but no other coordinating conjunction relative to the 
controls. This finding called for further analyses of how H.M. used and misused and, and results of 
those analyses suggested that H.M. overused and to compensate for deficits in creating novel  
sentence-level plans.  
5.1. Method 
5.1.1. Participants and Database 
The participants and database were identical to Study 1.  
5.1.2. Procedures 
We first analyzed the use frequency of three types of coordinating conjunctions in the TLC 
database: and (as in I went to Boston and Cambridge), but (as in He shot, but missed), and so (as in I 
stood up so I could see). Because or, as in Did you walk or take a cab, was a target word, we did not 
analyze use frequency for this fourth type of coordinating conjunction (but see [54] for detailed 
analyses of H.M.’s use and misuse of or). Based on the results of our use frequency analyses, Study 3 
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then analyzed how H.M. used (and misused) and, together with related ways of conjoining 
propositions (e.g., temporal and causal subordinating conjunctions).  
5.2. Main Results 
5.2.1. Use Frequency of and, but, and so 
The mean use frequency of and was 0.057 per word for H.M. versus 0.024 for the controls  
(SD = 0.016), a reliable 2.06 SD difference, with more instances for H.M. than the controls. The mean 
use frequency of but was 0.003 per word for H.M. versus 0.010 for the controls (SD = 0.007), a  
non-reliable 1.0 SD difference. The mean use frequency of so was too infrequent for meaningful 
statistical analysis: 0.001 per word for H.M. versus 0.057 per word for the controls (SD = 0.016). In 
short, and was the only non-target coordinating conjunction that H.M. used reliably more often than 
the memory-normal controls.  
5.2.2. The Functions of and 
As a first step toward understanding why H.M. overused and, we analyzed use frequencies for the 
three major functions of and: to conjoin individual words (e.g., Mary and I), to conjoin noun phrases 
(e.g., the administration building and its inhabitants, and verb phrases (e.g., have our cake and eat it 
too), and to conjoin propositions (e.g., She wants to behave herself and he likes that). Unlike the 
controls, H.M. only used and to conjoin propositions and never to conjoin noun phrases, verb phrases, 
or individual words (with one possible exception and two indeterminate instances where errors 
obscured what units H.M. was trying to conjoin). 
5.2.3. Use Frequency of and versus Other Ways of Conjoining Propositions  
Why did H.M. overuse and but no other coordinating conjunction relative to the controls? And why 
did H.M. only use and to conjoin propositions rather than phrases or isolated words? Related to these 
questions is a third question: Does H.M. also overuse other means of conjoining propositions relative 
to the controls? To address this question, Study 3 examined how often H.M. conjoined propositions 
using correlative conjunctions (either ... or, neither ... nor, both ... and, and not only ... but also); 
subordinating conjunctions (after, before, unless, although, if, until, as, since, when, because, whereas, 
and while); and complementation structures (infinitive clauses, as in He hopes to leave early; gerund 
clauses, as in He enjoys doing that; that clauses, as in She hinted that we should get the lead out; and 
who clauses, as in He knew who came).  
Together, mean use frequencies for correlative conjunctions, subordinating conjunctions, and 
propositional complementation did not differ reliably for H.M. (0.078 per word) versus the controls 
(0.078 per word; SD = 0.021), unlike propositional conjunction via and, which did differ reliably for 
H.M. (0.139 per word) versus the controls (0.102 per word; SD = 0.018). In short, relative to the 
controls, H.M. overused and but no other means of conjoining propositions. 
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5.3. Subsidiary Results: Troubles Accompanying H.M.’s Propositional Conjunctions 
5.3.1. Run-on Sentences: Trouble Linked With and But No Other Propositional Conjunction 
Run-on sentences conjoin semantically unrelated themes or topics, a type of trouble reliably 
associated with H.M.’s use of and. Examples are (11), where and conjoins two semantically unrelated 
themes (it is wrong for her to be and the way he’s dressed), and (12), where and conjoins four 
unrelated themes: pie was back here and coffee is in there and this is boiled milk and this is not liquid. 
There were no examples where H.M. produced run-on sentences using other ways of conjoining 
propositions and the controls never produced run-on sentences (a reliable 6.0 SD difference  
by convention). 
(11). H.M.: “it’s wrong for her to be and he’s dressed just as this ...” (Run-on sentence; see 
the supplementary materials for H.M.’s complete utterance).  
(12). H.M.: “Well this pie is—or the pie here was back here—and uh coffee is in there 
because heat a solid and this is only boiled milk say milk there and this is not liquid but 
only ice.” (Run-on sentence) 
5.3.2. Troubles Accompanying All Propositional Conjunctions  
H.M.’s use of and shared three types of trouble with other propositional conjunctions: 
ungrammatical uses, inaccurate references, and non-sequiturs. However, propositional conjunctions of 
the controls exhibited none of these troubles (reliable 6.0 SD differences by convention). 
5.3.2.1. Ungrammatical Uses  
Both omission- and commission-type misuses of and rendered H.M.’s sentences ungrammatical. In 
omission-type misuses such as (13) and (14), H.M. omitted one of the two or more entities that and 
must conjoin, thereby violating the TLC instruction to produce grammatical sentences. 
(13). H.M.: “And he has to use his legs to climb.” (incomplete sentence) 
(14). H.M.: “And that man is trying to tell that woman not to sit there because it’s wet 
paint.” (incomplete sentence) 
Commission-type misuses of and rendered sentences ungrammatical by violating the “same-syntax 
rule” or “coordinative structure constraint.” Under the same-syntax rule, coordinating conjunctions 
must conjoin units in the same lexical or syntactic category, e.g., two main verbs, as in I have seen and 
heard Wagner’s Tannhauser; two noun phrases, as in I went to the symphony and the opera; or two 
propositions, as in I want that and it’s available (see, e.g., [63]). H.M. often violated this same-syntax 
rule by using and to conjoin different lexical or syntactic categories, thereby rendering his sentences 
ungrammatical, incoherent, and difficult to understand. For example, under one interpretation, H.M.’s 
and in (15) conjoins a verb phrase (traveled on that bus) with a proposition (have it drive it off), a 
violation of the same-syntax rule.  
(15). H.M.: “Melanie tra … on that bus, the scrawny bus and have it drive it off … it, it 
drives it off.” (uncorrected misuse of and) 
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H.M. also produced ungrammatical sentences using other means of conjoining propositions, as in 
(16a–d), where he misused the subordinating conjunctions because and if without correction, and in 
(16e), where he produced the uncorrected error some her when conjoining a proposition with  
a complement.  
(16a). H.M.: “Because it’s too hard to do it that way.” (Uncorrected misuse of 
subordinating conjunction in bold: incomplete sentence) 
(16b). H.M.: “Because it’s wrong for her to be and he’s dressed just as this that he’s 
dressed.” (Uncorrected misuse of subordinating conjunction in bold: incomplete sentence) 
(16c). H.M.: “And that man is trying to tell that woman not to sit there because it’s wet 
paint.” (Uncorrected misuse of subordinating conjunction in bold: because it’s wet paint 
substituted for because the paint is wet)  
(16d). H.M.: “If they don’t use legs like he does … and his hands, they could fall.” 
(Uncorrected misuses in a subordinating conjunction in bold: omission of their in their 
legs, substitution of his hands for their hands) 
(16e). H.M.: “I like some her … what she had.” (Uncorrected error some her, plus 
omission of of in the complement of what she had was)  
5.3.2.2. Inaccurate References 
H.M.’s uses of and often falsely characterized a TLC picture, as in (17), where “and the same way 
as her” inaccurately describes a male and female customer in a clothing store as similarly dressed 
(whereas the male customer and male clerk are similarly dressed). To accurately describe the picture, 
H.M. should have said something like and he’s dressed the same way as this man is. Likewise in (18), 
H.M.’s “and he is just waiting to get waited on” inaccurately describes a man being waited on in a 
cafeteria: To accurately describe the picture, H.M. should have said something like and he is just 
getting waited on. 
(17). H.M.: “Because it’s wrong for her to be and he’s dressed just as this that he’s dressed 
and the same way—as her.” (Inaccurate reference) 
(18). H.M.: “He is getting some of this and it isn't pointed out here what it is and he is just 
waiting to get waited on.” (Inaccurate reference) 
H.M. also produced inaccuracies using other propositional conjunctions, as in (19), where the 
subordinating conjunction because inaccurately describes the TLC picture because people are neither 
right nor wrong to be, contrary to the implication of H.M.’s “because it’s wrong for her to be.” 
(19). H.M.: “Because it’s wrong for her to be.” (Inaccurate reference) 
5.3.2.3. Non-sequiturs 
H.M.’s use of and often yielded non-sequiturs or logical contradictions, as in (20), where “and to 
see what he’s using to pull himself up besides his hands” logically contradicts H.M.’s preceding 
proposition: “David wanted him to fall.” If the climber in the picture fell, David would be unable to 
see how he was pulling himself up.  
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(20). H.M.: “David wanted him to fall and to see what he’s using to pull himself up 
besides his hands.” (Non-sequitur involving use of and; For expository reasons, we have 
corrected several irrelevant errors in (20): see the supplementary materials for H.M.’s 
uncorrected utterance). 
H.M.’s subordinating conjunctions also yielded non-sequiturs, as in (21), where “because heat a 
solid” is logically unrelated to H.M.’s sentence topic, the location of coffee and pie in the picture.  
(21). H.M.: “Well this pie is—or the pie here was back here—and uh coffee is in there 
because heat a solid.” (non-sequitur associated with because) 
5.4. Discussion 
Why was and the only way of conjoining propositions that H.M. overused relative to the controls? 
And why did H.M. overuse and even though other ways of conjoining propositions were less prone to 
“trouble” (run-on sentences)? To address these and other questions raised by the present results, we 
developed the compensation hypothesis discussed next. 
5.4.1. The Compensation Hypothesis 
Under the compensation hypothesis, H.M. has difficulty forming coherent plans for producing 
novel (never-previously encoded) phrases and sentences, and to compensate for this difficulty on the 
TLC, H.M. generated familiar (previously encoded in immediate or long term memory) propositions 
via free association and used and to conjoin them into sentences. This proposition-level free 
association + and strategy complied with the TLC instruction to produce a single grammatical sentence 
(because propositions conjoined via and are grammatical under the same-syntax rule), but caused a 
“troublesome” side effect shared by no other way of conjoining propositions: run-on sentences 
consisting of unrelated propositions. Nonetheless, ungrammatical sentences, inaccurate references, 
non-sequiturs, and uncorrected misuses also accompanied these other ways of conjoining propositions 
because of H.M.’s difficulty in creating never-previously encoded sentences that are coherent  
and accurate.  
This compensation hypothesis raises four basic questions: Does H.M. have difficulty forming 
coherent plans for producing novel sentences? Does H.M. produce reliably more free associations than 
memory-normal controls when creating novel sentences? Do H.M.’s uses of and on the TLC fit the 
standard definition of free association? And how did H.M.’s free association + and strategy benefit his 
TLC performance under the compensation hypothesis? As discussed next, evidence bearing on these 
and other questions indicates that the compensation hypothesis is sufficiently plausible to warrant 
further test. 
5.4.2. Does H.M. Have Difficulty Forming Coherent Plans for Novel Phrases and Sentences?  
Forming coherent plans for producing novel phrases and sentences has been problematic for H.M. 
in a wide range of tasks; see, e.g., [3,5,8–10,64,65], and [2] (as analyzed in [6]). 
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5.4.3. H.M.’s Propositional Conjunctions: Free Association as Classically Defined?  
As classically defined (see [66]), words produced via free association are unrelated or inappropriate 
to the current situational or conceptual context but strongly related to thoughts, events, or concepts 
with preformed associations in memory. Consistent with this classical definition, H.M. often used and 
to conjoin concepts with preformed associations in memory but no obvious relation to the current 
conceptual or situational context, here, the instruction to use the target words to accurately describe a 
TLC picture. For example, preformed associations in semantic memory between waiting and waited in 
(18) almost certainly triggered H.M.’s inaccurate claim that the man is waiting to get waited on rather 
than is being waited on, as clearly indicated in the TLC picture. Similarly, preformed associations in 
memory between the concepts heat, solids, and liquids in (12) almost certainly triggered H.M.’s 
irrelevant non-sequitur “because heat a solid” in “coffee is in there because heat a solid and...”. 
Also consistent with the classical definition of free association, irrelevant (or imagined) aspects of 
the pictures often triggered and-linked thoughts unrelated to the TLC goals, as in (11), where H.M. 
said “it is wrong for her to be and the way he’s dressed”, and in (12), where H.M. said “pie was back 
here and coffee is in there and this is boiled milk and this is not liquid”.  
5.4.4. How Did H.M. Benefit from His Free Association + and Strategy? 
Under the compensation hypothesis, H.M. used and to conjoin two or more propositions retrieved 
via free association, thereby compensating for his difficulties in constructing coherent sentence-level 
plans. This proposition-level free association + and strategy obviated the need to construct an overall 
sentence plan because any two propositions conjoined via and yield a sentence that satisfies the  
same-syntax rule and the TLC instruction to produce a single grammatical sentence. For example, 
H.M.’s conjoined propositions in “pie was back here and coffee is in there and this is boiled milk and 
this is not liquid” yield a single sentence that is grammatical but incoherent and run-on.  
5.4.5. Why Did H.M. Prefer to Conjoin Propositions via and?  
Using and to conjoin propositions involves simpler, more general, and less constrained processes 
than other ways of conjoining propositions. Only one relation between the conjoined units (the  
same-syntax concatenation rule) must be computed when using and, whereas two additional and more 
complex relations must be computed when using the subordinating conjunctions although, after, and 
because: Although requires computation of concatenation, subordination, and contrary relations; after 
requires computation of concatenation, subordination, and temporal relations; and because requires 
computation of concatenation, subordination, and causal relations. To compensate for his deficits in 
forming grammatical plans for novel sentences, H.M. therefore preferred and as the easiest way to 
conjoin propositions retrieved via free association under the compensation hypothesis.  
5.4.6. Why Was H.M.’s and More “Troublesome” Than Other Propositional Conjunctions?  
H.M.’s added trouble with and only showed up as run-on sentences, not other types of misuses, and 
directly reflected his free association + and strategy under the compensation hypothesis. However, the 
remaining “troubles” associated with any way of conjoining propositions (ungrammatical sentences, 
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inaccurate references, non-sequiturs, and uncorrected misuses) reflect a more general cause under the 
compensation hypothesis: H.M.’s inability to form coherent plans or internal representations for novel 
phrases and propositions.  
6. Summary, Conclusions and Caveats 
Use frequency analyses in Study 1 provided our first major result: that H.M. could retrieve (at least) 
21 lexical categories and one syntactic category (noun phrases) with no lower relative frequency than 
matched memory-normal controls on the TLC. This finding contrasts with the underuse of specific 
lexical and syntactic categories that characterizes category-specific aphasia, and suggests that H.M.’s 
category-specific mechanisms for retrieving words in phrases and phrases in sentences are intact.  
Also consistent with intact brain mechanisms for retrieving already encoded phrases, H.M. has 
produced many familiar phrases without errors in conversational speech since his lesion. Examples are 
the six multi-word noun phrases in H.M.’s brief paragraph in (1): “a lay teacher”, “the kids”, “the 
nuns”, “the grade”, “the next grade”, “young kids”, and “in a way”. H.M. almost certainly encoded all 
six phrases prior to his lesion, and his error-free use of familiar phrases was probably one of the 
reasons why researchers interacting informally with H.M. since his lesion (mistakenly) assumed that 
his language skills were completely intact (see [3,6] for additional reasons). 
The simplest explanation of Study 1 use-frequency results is that (a) frontal areas contain the 
activating-mechanisms for retrieving already-encoded words, phrases, and propositions, and  
(b) retrieval mechanisms in H.M.’s frontal cortex are intact. Amnesics with compound frontal and 
hippocampal damage such as Clive Wearing reinforce and extend this account. Consistent with their 
hippocampal damage, Clive and H.M. cannot form new episodic memories (except via massive 
repetition; see [54]). However, using his intact frontal cortex, H.M. can retrieve episodic memories 
encoded before his lesion, whereas due to his frontal damage, Clive cannot ([67], pp. 187–213).  
Studies 1 and 2 provided our second major result: H.M.’s reliable overuse of proper names in 
speech and writing relative to memory-normal controls. In a follow-up study, MacKay et al. [54] 
examined H.M.’s use of proper names in detail and using the compensation hypothesis developed in 
Study 3, concluded that H.M. overused proper names to compensate for his inability to encode 
structures with the same function as proper names.  
The compensation hypothesis in Study 3 was developed to explain H.M.’s reliable overuse of the 
coordinating conjunction and relative to memory-normal controls in Study 1. Under this hypothesis, 
H.M. overused and for three reasons: (a) to compensate for his inability to construct sentence-level 
plans that were novel, accurate, and grammatical [3,5,6,9–11,65,68]; (b) to conjoin familiar 
propositions into multi-proposition sentences; and (c) to satisfy the instruction to describe TLC 
pictures using a single grammatical sentence.  
All three factors together contributed to a proposition-level strategy that fit the classical definition 
of free association but was more complex than word-level free associations observed to date (see [66]). 
Using this proposition-level free association strategy, H.M. retrieved familiar propositions via free 
association and conjoined them via and, the least constrained way of conjoining one or more 
propositions to form a grammatical sentence. This strategy obviated the need to form a novel sentence 
plan and satisfied the TLC instruction to produce a single grammatical sentence, but carried a negative 
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consequence seen with none of the other propositional conjunctions that H.M. used: run-on  
sentences (see also the negative consequences of H.M.’s proper name compensation strategy in  
MacKay et al. [54]). 
Several caveats are in order regarding the present results and conclusions. One is that H.M.’s 
normal use-frequency profile for noun phrases and (at least) 18 lexical categories in Study 1 does not 
imply that his language skills are “relatively intact” or “unimpaired”: H.M.’s ungrammatical uses, 
inaccurate references, run-on sentences, and non-sequiturs in Study 3 indicate that his mechanisms for 
encoding new phrases, propositions, and sentences are impaired (see also [54]).  
Another caveat is that the compensation hypothesis described the observations in Study 3, but did 
not predict them. New observations are needed to test the compensation hypothesis (a process 
undertaken in [54]). 
As a final caveat, the present use frequency results are specific to H.M. rather than to amnesia in 
general: Amnesics with different types of brain damage can be expected to compensate in different 
ways (for additional caveats, see [54]). For example, it is unsurprising that the amnesic patients in 
Almor, Kempler, MacDonald, Andersen and Tyler [69] used reliably more pronouns than  
memory-normal controls, whereas H.M. used pronouns with the same relative frequency as  
memory-normal controls in Studies 1–2. The Almor et al. [69] amnesics were compensating for 
diffuse cortical damage linked to Alzheimer’s Disease, whereas H.M. had virtually no cortical damage 
and was compensating for hippocampal region damage. Additional case studies therefore seem 
warranted to explore the parameters and range of category-specific compensation in amnesics with 
different types of brain damage. As Ramachandran ([70], p. xi) notes, careful study of single cases has 
in the past proved instrumental in discovering most, and perhaps all, of the syndromes in neurology.  
Acknowledgments 
The authors gratefully acknowledge support from the Samuel A. MacKay Memorial Research Fund 
and NIH grant R01 AG 09755. We thank Suzanne Corkin for permission to study H.M. from 1997 to 
1999, and Kataryna Boese, Alicia Chang, Meghan Gould, Jenifer Taylor, and Diane Marian for general 
research assistance from 1999 to 2006.  
Conflict of Interest 
The authors declare no conflict of interest.  
References and Notes 
1. Milner, B.; Corkin, S.; Teuber, H.-L. Further analysis of the hippocampal amnesic syndrome:  
14-year follow-up study of H.M. Neuropsychologia 1968, 6, 215–234. 
2. Marslen-Wilson, W. Biographical interviews with H.M. 1970. Unpublished transcript. Available 
online: http://www.mackay.bol.ucla.edu (accessed on 15 October 2012). 
3. MacKay, D.G.; James, L.E.; Hadley, C.B.; Fogler, K.A. Speech errors of amnesic H.M.: Unlike 
everyday slips-of-the-tongue. Cortex 2011, 47, 377–408. 
Brain Sci. 2013, 3 290 
 
4. MacKay, D.G.; James, L.E. Aging, retrograde amnesia, and the binding problem for phonology 
and orthography: A longitudinal study of “hippocampal amnesic” H.M. Aging Neuropsychol. 
Cogn. 2002, 9, 298–333. 
5. MacKay, D.G.; Hadley, C.B. Supra-normal age-linked retrograde amnesia: Lessons from an older 
amnesic (H.M.). Hippocampus 2009, 19, 424–445. 
6. MacKay, D.G.; Burke, D.M.; Stewart, R. H.M.’s language production deficits: Implications for 
relations between memory, semantic binding, and the hippocampal system. J. Mem. Lang. 1998, 
38, 28–69. 
7. Corkin, S. Lasting consequences of bilateral medial temporal lobectomy: Clinical course and 
experimental findings in H.M. Semin. Neurol. 1984, 4, 249–259. 
8. MacKay, D.G.; James, L.E. The binding problem for syntax, semantics, and prosody: H.M.’s 
selective sentence-reading deficits under the theoretical-syndrome approach. Lang. Cogn. 
Process. 2001, 16, 419–460. 
9. MacKay, D.G.; James, L.E.; Hadley, C.B. Amnesic H.M.’s performance on the language 
competence test: Parallel deficits in memory and sentence production. J. Clin. Exp. Neuropsychol. 
2008, 30, 280–300. 
10. MacKay, D.G.; James, L.E.; Taylor, J.; Marian, D.E. Amnesic H.M. exhibits parallel deficits and 
sparing in language and memory: Systems versus binding theory accounts. Lang. Cogn. Process. 
2007, 22, 377–452. 
11. MacKay, D.G.; Stewart, R.; Burke, D.M. H.M. revisited: Relations between language 
comprehension, memory, and the hippocampal system. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 1998, 10, 377–394. 
12. Corkin, S.; Amaral, D.G.; González, R.G.; Johnson, K.A.; Hyman, B.T. H. M.’s medial temporal 
lobe lesion: Findings from magnetic resonance imaging. J. Neurosci. 1997, 17, 3964–3979. 
13. Lashley, K.S. The problem of serial order in behavior. In Cerebral Mechanisms in Behavior; 
Jeffress, L.A., Ed.; Hafner: New York, NY, USA, 1951; pp. 112–136. 
14. Skotko, B.G.; Rubin, D.C.; Tupler, L.A. H.M.’s personal crossword puzzles: Understanding 
memory and language. Memory 2008, 16, 89–96. 
15. Bates, E.; Chen, S.; Tzeng, O.; Li, P.; Opie, M. The noun-verb problem in Chinese aphasia. Brain 
Lang. 1991, 41, 203–233. 
16. Berndt, R.S.; Haendiges, A.N.; Burton, M.W.; Mitchum, C.C. Grammatical class and imageability 
in aphasic word production: their effects are independent. J. Neurolinguistics 2002, 15, 353–371. 
17. Caramazza, A.; Hillis, A.E.; Leek, E.C.; Miozzo, M. The organization of lexical knowledge  
in the brain: Evidence from category- and modality-specific deficits. In Mapping the Mind;  
Hirschfeld, L.A., Gelman, S.A., Eds.; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1994;  
pp. 68–84. 
18. De Renzi, E.; Di Pellegrino, G. Sparing of verbs and preserved but ineffectual reading in a patient 
with impaired word production. Cortex 1995, 31, 693–636. 
19. Jonkers, R.; Bastiaanse, R. How selective are selective word class deficits? Two case studies of 
action and object naming. Aphasiology 1998, 12, 245–256. 
20. Job, R.; Miozzo, M.; Sartori, G. On the existence of category-specific impairments. A reply to 
Parkin and Stewart. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. A 1993, 46, 511–516. 
Brain Sci. 2013, 3 291 
 
21. Kemmerer, D.; Tranel, D. A double dissociation between the meanings of action verbs and 
locative prepositions. Neurocase 2003, 9, 421–435. 
22. Luzzatti, C.; Raggi, R.; Zonca, G.; Pistarini, C.; Contardi, A.; Pinna, G.-D. On the nature of the 
selective impairment of verb and noun retrieval: The role of word frequency and of imageability. 
Cortex 2001, 37, 724–726. 
23. McCarthy, R.; Warrington, E.K. Category specificity in an agrammatic patient: The relative 
impairment of verb retrieval and comprehension. Neuropsychologia 1985, 23, 709–727. 
24. Miceli, G.; Silveri, M.C.; Nocentini, I.; Caramazza, A. Patterns of dissociation in comprehension 
and production of nouns and verbs. Aphasiology 1988, 2, 351–358. 
25. Miceli, G.; Silveri, M.C.; Villa, G.; Caramazza, A. On the basis for the agrammatic’s difficulty in 
producing main verbs. Cortex 1984, 20, 207–220. 
26. Mondini, S.; Luzzatti, C.; Semenza, C.; Calza, A. Prepositional compounds are sensitive to 
agrammatism: Consequences for models of lexical retrieval. Brain Lang. 1997, 60, 78–80. 
27. Rapp, B.; Caramazza, A. Lexical deficits. In Acquired Aphasia; Sarno, M.T., Ed.; Academic 
Press: San Diego, CA, USA, 1998; pp. 187–227. 
28. Silveri, M.C.; Di Betta, A.M. Noun-verb dissociations in brain-damaged patients: Further 
evidence. Neurocase 1997, 3, 477–488. 
29. Sartori, G.; Miozzo, M.; Job, R. Category-specific naming impairments? Yes. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. A 
1993, 46, 489–504. 
30. Tabossi, P.; Collina, S.; Caporali, A.; Pizzioli, F.; Basso, A. Speaking of events: The case of C.M. 
Cogn. Neuropsychol. 2010, 27, 152–180. 
31. Tyler, L.K.; Bright, P.; Fletcher, P.; Stamatakis, E.A. Neural processing of nouns and verbs: The 
role of inflectional morphology. Neuropsychologia 2004, 42, 512–523. 
32. Tyler, L.K.; Cobb, H. Processing bound grammatical morphemes in context: The case of an 
aphasic patient. Lang. Cogn. Process. 1987, 2, 245–262. 
33. Zingeser, L.B.; Berndt, R.S. Retrieval of nouns and verbs in agrammatism and anomia. Brain 
Lang. 1990, 39, 14–32. 
34. Goodglass, H.; Kaplan, E. The Assessment of Aphasia and Related Disorders; Williams & 
Wilkins: Baltimore, MD, USA, 1983. 
35. Ulatowska, H.K.; Chapman, S.B. Discourse macrostructure in aphasia. In Discourse Analysis and 
Applications: Studies in Adult Clinical Populations; Bloom, R.L., Obler, L.K., de Santi, S., 
Ehrlich, J.S., Eds.; Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Hillsdale, NJ, USA, 1994; pp. 29–46. 
36. Goodglass, H. The Assessment of Aphasia and Related Disorders; Lippencott, Wiliams & 
Williams: Philadelphia, PA, USA, 2001. 
37. Albert, M.L.; Goodglass, H.; Helm, N.A.; Rubens, A.B.; Alexander, M.P. Clinical Aspects of 
Dysphasia; Springer: New York, NY, USA, 1981. 
38. Blumstein, S. A Phonological Investigation of Aphasic Speech; Mouton: The Hague,  
The Netherlands, 1973. 
39. Nicolas, L.; Harryman, E.; Kreshek, J. Terminology of Speech Disorders; Williams & Wilkins: 
Baltimore, MD, USA, 1978. 
40. Saffran, E.M.; Schwartz, M.F.; Marin, O.S.M. The word order problem in agrammatism: II. 
Production. Brain Lang. 1980, 10, 263–280. 
Brain Sci. 2013, 3 292 
 
41. MacKay, D.G. The Organization of Perception and Action: A Theory for Language and Other 
Cognitive Skills; Springer-Verlag: New York, NY, USA, 1987. 
42. Burke, D.M.; Shafto, M.A. Language and Aging. In The Handbook of Aging and Cognition; 
Craik, F.I.M., Salthouse, T.A., Eds.; Psychology Press: New York, NY, USA, 2004; pp. 373–443. 
43. Garnham, A.; Shillcock, R.C.; Brown, G.D.A.; Mill, A.I.D.; Cutler, A. Slips of the tongue in the 
London-Lund corpus of spontaneous conversation. In Slips of the Tongue and Language 
Production; Cutler, A., Ed.; Mouton: New York, NY, USA, 1982; pp. 251–263. 
44. Fromkin, V.A. Appendix: A sample of speech errors. In Speech Errors as Linguistic Evidence; 
Mouton: The Hague, The Netherlands, 1973; pp. 243–269. 
45. MacKay, D.G. Spoonerisms: The structure of errors in the serial order of speech. 
Neuropsychologia 1970, 8, 323–350. 
46. Dell, G.S. A spreading-activation theory of retrieval in sentence production. Psychol. Rev. 1986, 
93, 283–321. 
47. H.M. died at age 82 in 2008. Our use of present tense refers not to the present publication date but 
to H.M. when tested from ages 44 to 71 in the present research. 
48. Wiig, E.H.; Secord, W. Test of Language Competence: Expanded Edition; Psychological 
Corporation: San Antonio, TX, USA, 1988. 
49. Scoville, W.B.; Milner, B. Loss of recent memory after bilateral hippocampal lesions. J. Neurol. 
Neurosurg. Psychiatry 1957, 20, 11–21. 
50. MacKay, D.G.; Johnson, L.W. Error detection, error correction, and medial temporal lobe 
amnesia: H.M. and mirror neuron theory. Neuropsychologia 2012, submitted for publication. 
51. Salat, D.H.; van der Kouwe, A.J.W.; Tuch, D.S.; Quinn, B.T.; Fischl, B.; Dale, A.M.; Corkin, S. 
Neuroimaging H.M.: A 10-year follow-up examination. Hippocampus 2006, 16, 936–945. 
52. Loftus, M.; Knight, R.T.; Amaral, D.G. An analysis of atrophy in the medial mammillary nucleus 
following hippocampal and fornix lesions in humans and nonhuman primates. Exp. Neurol. 2000, 
163, 180–190. 
53. Wilkinson, A.; Davies, I. The influence of age and dementia on the neurone population of the 
mammillary bodies. Age Ageing 1978, 7, 151–160. 
54. MacKay, D.G.; Johnson, L.W.; Hadley, C.B. Compensating for language deficits in amnesia II: 
H.M.’s spared and impaired encoding categories. Brain Sci. 2012, submitted for publication. 
55. Chomsky, N. Syntactic Structures; Mouton: The Hague, The Netherlands, 1957. 
56. Dryer, M.A. Noun phrase structure. In Language Typology and Syntactic Description: Complex 
Constructions; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2007; pp. 151–205. 
57. Givón, T. Syntax: An Introduction; John Benjamins: Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2001. 
58. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 4th ed.; Houghton Mifflin: Boston, 
MA, USA, 2000. 
59. Sagar, H.J.; Cohen, N.J.; Corkin, S.; Growdon, J. Dissociations among processes in remote 
memory. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 1985, 444, 533–535. 
60. Burke, D.M.; MacKay, D.G.; Worthley, J.S.; Wade, E. On the tip of the tongue: What causes 
word finding failures in young and older adults? J. Mem. Lang. 1991, 30, 542–579. 
61. Cohen, G.; Burke, D.M. Memory for proper names: A review. Memory 1993, 1, 249–263. 
62. Semenza, C. The neuropsychology of proper names. Mind Lang. 2009, 24, 347–369. 
Brain Sci. 2013, 3 293 
 
63. Bach, E. On the relationship between word-grammar and phrase-grammar. Nat. Lang. Linguist. 
Theory 1983, 1, 65–89. 
64. MacKay, D.G. Stage theories refuted. In A Companion to Cognitive Science; Bechtel, W., 
Graham, G., Eds.; Blackwell: Oxford, UK, 1998; pp. 671–678. 
65. MacKay, D.G.; James, L.E. Visual cognition in amnesic H.M.: Selective deficits on the  
What’s-Wrong-Here and Hidden-Figure tasks. J. Clin. Exp. Neuropsychol. 2009, 31, 769–789. 
66. Cohen, E.D. C. G. Jung and the Scientific Attitude; Philosophical Library: New York, NY,  
USA, 1975. 
67. Sacks, O. Musicophilia: Tales of Music and the Brain; Alfred A. Knopf: New York, NY,  
USA, 2007. 
68. James, L.E.; MacKay, D.G. H.M., word knowledge, and aging: Support for a new theory of  
long-term retrograde amnesia. Psychol. Sci. 2001, 12, 485–492. 
69. Almor, A.; Kempler, D.; MacDonald, M.C.; Andersen, E.S.; Tyler, L.K. Why do Alzheimer 
patients have difficulty with pronouns? Working memory, semantics, and reference in 
comprehension and production in Alzheimer’s disease. Brain Lang. 1999, 67, 202–227. 
70. Ramachandran, V.S. A Brief Tour of Human Consciousness; Pearson Education: New York, NY, 
USA, 2004.  
© 2013 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article 
distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/). 
